

Very secret

(3) of 70. What change would there be in Japan's international position, especially in her position as regards China as compared with the pre-Incident time, in the case the U.S. memorandum of Oct. 2, were fully accepted?

There are not a few points which are not clear yet in the negotiations up to now about how far the United States will accept Japan's requests in the so-called Oct. 2 draft (based on the June 27th draft). If however, the so-called four principles, as well as (1) the problem of the stationing and withdrawal of troops in China and French Indo-China, (2) non-discriminatory treatment regarding international trade in China and (3) the problem of the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact - were to be settled in accordance with the U.S. insistence, "The great task of the Imperial Government to bring the China Incident to a conclusion and to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere would afford some scope for third Power participation and it appears that our independent diplomacy would be restricted to some extent, and we should have to be prepared as a result for the occurrence of a reactionary situation of considerable importance in our country; on the whole, however, there is hope that our position as regards China would be strengthened to some extent as compared with pre-Incident times, while on the other hand it would not be impossible to gradually establish the Co-prosperity Sphere by carrying out the peaceful progress of the Empire chiefly in Manchuria, China and French Indo-China; and by preserving our national defense at a time when the other Powers were exhausted with the War we could expect the Empire's voice to gain weight and we would consequently be able to prepare for future activity.

Such being the case, it cannot necessarily be admitted that we should sustain any substantial disadvantage, but the U.S. draft cannot be accepted as it is because there are not a few disadvantages when it is investigated in the light of various conditions both in the country and abroad.

1. Matters Relating to China and Manchuria.

(a) Under the present situation the negotiations between Japan and the United States are the only means of settling the China Incident there being no possibility that it will be settled by any other means.

(b) Though the U.S.'s four principles contain something to the effect that the existing situation should not be broken by means of armed force, the United States is making no objection to "the recognition of Manchukuo" which is one of the conditions of the peace treaty between Japan and China proposed by us, and if it should be realized the position of Manchukuo would be established all the more firmly.

(c) In case the principle of equality in international trade is recognized with regard to economic activities in China, there would not only be no particular disadvantage as compared with pre-Incident times; on the contrary, by adhering to the present established facts, a considerable preferential position might be retained. It must, however, be anticipated that Great Britain, the United States, and others might make various complaints in the future on the strength of the said principle.

(d) Even in case an agreement should not be reached between Japan and the United States on the stationing of troops, not only it is supposed that the United States would admit one or two years' extension of time but also it would not be quite impossible to have the stationing of troops admitted through direct negotiation between Japan and China in their peace negotiations.

(e) Though it is doubtful whether the hostile feelings of the Chinese would die out immediately after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and China, it is expected that the people, impoverished by a war of many years, would welcome peace, that Japan and China would be reconciled, and that as a result, they would take a cooperative attitude in economic joint efforts.



(f) In view of the fact that the Chinese Government will include some high officials of the Nanking Government, a considerable degree of cooperation can be expected in political, economic, and other problems, especially in developing natural resources, withdrawing concessions, managing the system of maritime customs, and other matters."

2. Matters Relating to French Indo-China, Thailand, the Netherlands Indies, and others.

(a) As regards French Indo-China, we have already strengthened our predominant position by means of the existing various agreements between Japan and French Indo-China; Therefore, cooperation between the two countries could be furthered even after the withdrawal of troops had been carried out provided that our measures were proper.

(b) As regards Thailand, the fear of being invaded by the big Powers will be removed, accordingly the relations between Japan and Thailand will gradually be improved and furthered, and the purchase of the rice which is (one of) our necessities and other matters will be facilitated.

(c) As one result of the practice of the principle of equality in trade in the Netherlands Indies and other areas in the South, the acquisition of resources necessary for the defence of the Empire such as kerosene, gum, tin, bauxite, and so forth would be made easier.

3. Other Matters.

(a) It cannot be said that the advantages which would result from the improvement of Japanese-American relations would necessarily be greater than they were before the Incident, but on the removal of political uneasiness a new commercial treaty would eventually be concluded. In view of the effect of the European War, the purchase of goods and materials would suffer considerable limitations. Be that as it may, the acquisition of national defence resources in considerable quantities would become possible and along with the non-discriminatory treatment in Central and South America, this would to a great extent

exert a favorable influence toward the establishment of a new order in East Asia, and besides, would stand Japan and America in good stead by furnishing them with a basis on which they would be able to hold an important position in restoring peace of the world in future.

(b) Following the consolidation of our position in Soviet relations the ability to accomplish our requests through peaceful negotiation would gradually be increased. Further, the following should be recognized as disadvantages in case the American plan should be accepted:

- a) There would be danger of inviting interference by the big Powers concerning East Asia questions.
- b) Public opinion in Japan would become agitated.
- c) The Nine Power Treaty would be reconfirmed.
- d) There would be fear of its exercising an unfavorable influence on the relations between Japan, Germany and Italy.



## C E R T I F I C A T E

WDC No. \_\_\_\_\_  
IPS No. 3111

### Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office. and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 8 pages, dated \_\_\_\_\_, 19\_\_\_\_, and described as follows: "WHAT WOULD BE THE CHANGE IN JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION, ESPECIALLY IN HER POSITION TOWARDS CHINA, AS COMPARED WITH THE PRE-INCIDENT TIME, IN CASE THE U.S. MEMORANDUM, DATED 2 OCTOBER, IS FULLY ACCEPTED."

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): Foreign Ministry.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of December 1947.

s/ K. Hayashi  
Signature of Official

SEAL

Witness: s/ K. Urabe

Chief, Archives Section.  
Official Capacity

### Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY SHIMOJIMA, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
5th day of December, 1947.

s/ Henry Shimojima  
NAME

Witness: s/ J. F. Munroe

Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity

3111

一〇ノ(三) 十月二日米魯普全時ニ答認セル場合  
國ノ國條地位就中對英地位ハ事變前ニ此シ如何  
ニ變化スルヤ

米國制ニ於テ所 謂十月二日米(六月二十一日英  
ヲ基礎トス)中日本側長求ラドノ通展通答認セ  
ントスルモノナルヤ今日通ノ交渉ニ於テ既ニ  
缺ク尠少カラサルモ假ニ所謂四原則並ニ(一)支那  
及佛領印度支那ニ於ケル駐兵及撤兵問題(二)支那  
ニ於ケル通關上ノ無差別待遇(三)三國條約ノ  
解釋及履行問題カ米側主張通りニ妥結セラルル

モノト假定スル時ハ

「帝國政府ノ支那事變完遂ハ大東亞其榮國建設ノ大業  
ニ關シ第三國兵ノ侵入ヲ具ワルコトナリ  
我ガ自主外交ニ最モ關係ヲ與ケルカ如キ親ヲ  
最モ之ニ伴ヒ國內ニ於テモ相當ノ民氣の發揚  
ハ要スルニ極スルヲ以テモ之ヲ全クニ  
以テ我ガ外交地位ハ事變前ニ比シ幾分強化セ  
ラルベシアリ他方對テ支那、佛領印度支那中心  
トスル帝國ノ平和的進展ヲ欲スコトニ依リ米  
英兩國新造的建設ヲ爲シ行ハルニアラサルハ

秘極



(イ) 現下ノ事態ニ於テ日米交渉ノ妥結ハ玄那事變  
解決唯一ノ方策ニシテ右以外解決ノ見込無

(口)米價四原則ニハ武力ニ依ル現狀打破ヲ認メサ

サル趣旨ノモノアリト雖モ我方提案ノ日英  
和平條約中「滿洲國ノ承認」ニ付米側ハ何  
等異議ヲ唱ヘ居ラサルヲ以テ之カ實現ヲ見  
ハ滿洲國ノ地位一層確立セラルヘシ

(ハ) 支那ニ於ケル經濟活動ニ付國際通關上ノ平等原則ヲ認メタル場合ニ於テモ事實前ニ比シ格別ノ不利益ナキノミナラス寧ロ今日ノ既成ノ事實ヲ維持スルコトニ依リ幾多ノ事

先的地歩ヲ保持シ得ヘシ尤モ將來右原則ヲ  
 楯ニ突米等ヨリ種々苦情ヲ提起シ來ルカ如キ  
 コトアルヲ覺悟セサルヘカラス

- (三) 陸兵條項ニ付日米間ニ約諾ヲ爲ササル場合  
 ニ於テモ撤兵ニ付テハ米側ニ於テ一兩年間  
 ノ猶豫ヘ之ヲ認ムヘシト想察セラルルノミ  
 ナラス日文和平交渉ノ目前至前直接交渉ニ  
 依リ陸兵ヲ認メシムルコト必シモ不可能事  
 ナラサルヘシ

- (四) 日文間和平成立支那側ノ以誠心直ニ解消ス  
 ルヤ疑問アルモ多年ノ民氣ニ滋弊セル一般  
 民衆ハ平和ヲ歡迎シ日文間和平ヲ喜シ兵ノ  
 結束經濟合作ニ付テモ協力的態度ニ出ツヘ  
 キコト認想セラル

- (五) 支那政府カ南京政府長人ヲ包含スヘキニモ  
 鑒ミ政治經濟其ノ他諸國已管ニ資源ノ開發  
 租界ノ回收、海關制度ノ適用等ニ付相當程  
 度ノ提携ヲ期待シ得ヘシ



ニ佛印、泰、蘭印等ニ歸スル事項

(イ) 佛印ニ付テハ現行日本佛印條約取極ニ注意キ  
既ニ優越的地歩ヲ固メ居ルヲ以テ假令撤兵  
ヲ實行スル後ニ於テモ我方ノ施策宜敷ヲ  
得ルニ於テハ兩國ノ提携ヲ増進スルヲ得ヘ  
シ

(ロ) 泰ニ付テハ列國ノ侵略ヲ恐ルルコトナキニ  
至リ自然日泰關係モ從前ニ比シ漸次改善増  
進セラレ我方必妥協賣タル米ノ買付等ヲ容  
易ナラシムヘシ

(ハ) 蘭印其他南方諸島ニ通商平等ノ原則カ行  
ヘルル結果石油、鐵礦、錫、「ボーキサイ  
ド」等帝國必兵國防資源ノ獲得カ容易トナ  
ルヘシ

ニ其他ノ事項

(イ) 日米關係ノ改善ニ於ル利益ハ必ラミシモ事  
變前ニ比シ大ナリト斷アラ得サルモ政治的  
不安ノ際カルルト共ニ新通商條約モ締結セ  
ラルルニ至ルヘシ獨賣ノ輸入ハ歐洲戰爭ト  
ノ關係モアリ相當機能ヲ受クヘキモ兎ニ角  
石油其他相當量ノ國防資源獲得可也トナリ

中南米地方ニ於ケル無差別待遇ト相換ツテ  
 東亞新秩序ノ建設ニハ少カラサル好影響ヲ  
 與フヘシ又將來世界平和克復ノ爲日米カ重  
 要ナル役割ヲ演スル基礎ヲ築キ得ルコトト  
 ナル利益アリ

(四) 満洲關係ニ於テ我方ノ進歩鞏固トナルニ從  
 ヒ漸次平和的交渉ニ依ル長久貫徹ノ可能態  
 増大スヘシ

尙米米ノ承諾ノ場合ハ

(イ) 東亞ノ問題ニ關シ列國容諒ヲ招來スル惧ア  
 ルコト

(ロ) 日本國體ノ涉關ヲ見ルヘキコト

(ハ) 九國條約ノ再確認トナルヘキコト

(ニ) 日獨停戰條ニ好マシカラサル影響ヲ與フル惧  
 アルコト等ハ不利ノ點トシテ認ムルヲ要ス



Dec. 3/11

證 明 書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 三 一 一 一 號  
國 際 檢 察 部

與 據 及 ビ 公 正 ニ 關 ス ル 證 明

余、林 壽 / HAYASHI Kōzō / ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、  
即チ、日本外務省文書課長トシテ、日本政府ト公的  
關係ニ在ルモノナルコト、又ニ該官更トシテ余ガ茲  
ニ添附セラレタル、八頁ヨリ成ル、千九百 年  
/ 昭和 年 附、下記題名、即チ十月二  
日米覺書全的ニ容認セル場合帝國ノ國際地位就中對  
支地位ハ爭變前ニ比シ如何ニ變化スルヤノ又書ノ保  
管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、又ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ綴ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ廢番號又ハ引  
用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名稱ヲモ  
特記スベシ)

外 務 省

千九百四十七年 / 昭和二十二年 / 十二月五日

東京ニ於テ 署名

當該官更者 名 欄

右ノ省ノ公的資格

證

人

林 壽 / H. HAYASHI / 署名捺印 /

文書課長

痛部勝馬 / M. URAHARA / 署名

Art.

Cart.

Doc. 3111

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ヘンリー・シモジマ／HENRY SHIMOJIMA／ハ余ガ軀  
合國最高指揮官總司令部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、  
玆ニ上記證氏ハ余ガ公榜上、日本政府ノ上記署名官  
吏ヨリ入手シタルモノナルコトヲ玆ニ證明ス。

千九百四十七年／昭和二十二年／十二月九日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏 名

ヘンリー・シモジマ

／署名／

／HENRY SHIMOJIMA／

右ノ者ノ公的資格

國際檢察部調査官

證

人

ジエー・エフ・マシロヤ

／J. F. MASIROYA／署名／